* The City University of New York School of Law, J.D. May 2005; currently employed at The Legal Aid Society, Civil Division It is important that readers understand who an author is and is not. I am not transgendered and therefore I apologize in advance for any misunderstanding or mischaracterization of the transgender movement and struggle for recognition that is central to this paper. As a queer, white male, I have been both privileged and the target of discrimination. I write this paper to highlight a small step in the movement towards equality and recognition of queer and trans lives in the law. Much thanks to Professor Ruthann Robson for her mentorship and inspiration as a lesbian and legal scholar. I thank Belkys García for her keen insight on this issue and for ongoing motivation. 1 In this Article, I will use the terms "transgender" and "transsexual" as synonyms. I use the term "transsexual" because this is the predominant term used in the case law. For a discussion on the definition of the term "transsexual," see, for example, In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68 (Md. 2003) , in which a transsexual woman sought a court-ordered name and gender change. I will use the definition used by the Heilig court, which cites a medical dictionary defining "transsexual" as " ' [a] person with the external genitalia and secondary sexual characteristics of one sex, but whose personal identification and psychosocial configuration is that of the opposite sex.' " Id. at 72 n.3 (quoting STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 186 (27th ed. 2000)). The court also notes that the medical definition of transsexual excludes those who "as a result of hormone therapy and sexual reassignment surgery have brought their genitalia and some secondary sexual characteristics into conformity with their personal identification." Id. The Heilig court also distinguishes the term "gender dysphoria," describing it as "a condition to be distinguished from transvestism (cross-dressing) and homosexuality (sexual attraction to persons of one's own gender.)" Id. However, the term "transgender" is generally a broader term referring to people whose gender identity or expression does not conform to those associated with their birth-sex. The transgender rights movement seeks to achieve recognition of a person's self-determined gender identity, as the plaintiff in Heilig asserted.
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[Vol. 9:209 male. Losing income becomes a major obstacle in sponsoring a spouse as a permanent resident because the applicant must demonstrate that he or she can support the alien 2 spouse and that the alien will not be a public charge or a drain on the resources of this country. 3 Aware of the complications that could ensue during the immigration interview if the U.S. citizen-spouse disclosed that she was transgender, we were tempted to tell her that she would be more successful if she wore men's clothes and acted like a man because her identity documentation, with the exception of her name, indicated her sex as male. To ask her to "act like a man," however, might have required her to betray one of the most fundamental and significant elements of her person, even though the stakes were incredibly high for the continuation of her relationship.
This example highlights several of the issues co-existing in the intersection of U.S. immigration policy, the transgender community's struggle for equality and recognition, and the fear of homosexual marriage in the United States. This Article inquires into current recognition of transgender marriage in the immigration context. When this Article was originally written, only two unpublished cases, the first two highlighted in this Article, existed on the subject. Finally, in May 2005, a third case was published. 4 It can be cited for the proposition that transsexual marriage, if valid in the state in which it was performed, is not homosexual marriage, is not subject to the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 (DOMA), 5 and is valid for federal immigration purposes. This development in the
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Although transgender marriage is not necessarily homosexual marriage, the two are often collapsed, especially when the original birth-sex of the transgender spouse is the same as the sex of the non-transgender spouse. However, this conception of transgender marriage is limited. There are many more possible marriages involving transgender people with different legal implications. The courts have considered factors including Partner A's sex at birth, Partner B's sex at birth, whether one or both partners have had genital reassignment surgery, and whether one or both partners' sexual reassignment precedes or follows the marriage. For example:
1. Partner A is female at birth. Partner B is female at birth. Partner A transitions 13 to male prior to the marriage. This may be a heterosexual marriage if sexual reassignment is recognized but will be deemed a homosexual marriage if it is not. 2. Partner A is female at birth. Partner B is male at birth. Partner A transitions to male prior to the marriage. This will be a homosexual marriage if sexual reassignment is recognized and a heterosexual marriage if it is not. 3. Partner A is female at birth. Partner B is male at birth. Both Partner A and B have sexual reassignment. The marriage remains heterosexual before and after sexual reassignment. 4. Partner A is female at birth. Partner B is male at birth. Partner A has sexual reassignment to male after a valid marriage was performed. The marriage was heterosexual but becomes homosexual if sexual reassignment is recognized. 14 As this Article will illustrate, transsexual marriage is not wellunderstood, and its validity or judicial recognition often depends heavily on objective documentary evidence that demonstrates an actual sexual reassignment through genital surgery. Courts' obsession with objective evidence certified by doctors and the medical ment. See Editorial, Bigotry in Ballots Gay Marriage Is Repudiated; So Is Fairness, PITTS-BURGH POST GAZETTE, Nov. 6, 2004, at A16. 13 Here, the word "transition" is used narrowly to describe the result of post-sexual reassignment surgery. The term "transition" can be used broadly to include the alteration of gender presentation, not just physical alteration of primary and secondary sexual organs. I do not seek to reify sexual reassignment surgery as the only mode of transitioning, nor as the primary goal for many transgender people. Sexual reassignment surgery is at times a complicated medical procedure, especially for female-tomale transgender persons. However, courts have placed a heavy emphasis on sexual functionality and the completion of sexual reassignment surgery before recognizing the transition.
14 These are not the only possibilities of transgender couplings, but they are the only marriages that could potentially be recognized by states other than Massachusetts and Vermont, which recognize homosexual unions. See model disregards the transgender person's gender identity. Furthermore, the legal system reinforces the gender binary. In order to recognize the marriage, courts must struggle to fit the transgender person into a rigid gender paradigm. This Article explores recent DHS policy and three Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 15 decisions to illuminate the relevant policy considerations at the nexus of immigration law and the recognition of transsexual marriage.
Part I of this Article will explore marriage-based immigration and the federal government's refusal to recognize same-sex marriage in both the federal and immigration context. Part II will discuss common themes in the history of judicial recognition or lack of recognition of transsexual marriages, especially as they relate to statutory interpretation, documentary evidence, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
16 Part III will examine the newly announced policy directive from DHS, 17 which essentially bans transsexual marriage-based immigration. Part IV will look at two recent unpublished cases 18 family-based, 22 and the diversity lottery system. 23 Of the various forms of immigration, immediate-family immigration holds a privileged position. 24 In fact, the benefits flowing from a marriage relationship are so central to the immigration schema that there are approximately 100 textual references to spouses, husbands, wives, and marriage. 25 Under immigration law, a U.S. citizen has the ability to petition for an "immediate relative" immigrant visa. "Immediate relative" is defined as child, parent, or spouse. 26 The terms "spouse," "husband," and "wife" are not defined within the INA, except to state that these terms do not include spouse, wife, or husband "by reason of any marriage ceremony where the contracting parties thereto are not physically present in the presence of each other, unless the marriage shall have been consummated." 27 The courts 
A. Challenging Immigration Policy
Congress has been described as possessing almost plenary power over immigration, allowing for only the most limited judicial review of immigration policy decisions. 36 The U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized that, in exercising its broad discretion over immigration, "Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens." 37 Arguments by U.S. citizens and their alien spouses against immigration restrictions using the rationale that marriage is a fundamental right have been unsuccessful, 38 despite the fact that the Supreme Court has declared marriage to be a fundamental right on several occasions. 39 In the immigration naturalization certificate; (4) biographic forms G-325A for both petitioner and beneficiary; and (5) one "ADIT" type photo of the petitioner and of the beneficiary. Id. After the amendments, legal permanent resident status is granted conditionally for two years after filing the petition, and the couple must petition to have the condition removed. The couple must satisfy four elements to prove their marriage was bona fide: (1) the marriage was entered into in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction where the marriage took place; (2) the marriage has not been judicially annulled or terminated; (3) no fee or other consideration was given for filing the visa petition; and (4) the parties to the marriage have maintained a bona fide marital relationship. Aliens in deportation proceedings cannot use marriage to stop the deportation. Those found to have perpetrated a fraudulent marriage are subject to a $250,000 fine and five years in prison. Id. at 7-8. 36 Adams, 673 F.2d at 1041. See also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) ("At the outset, it is important to underscore the limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that 'over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over' the admission of aliens." (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)). The cases "have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune from judicial control." Id. at 792 (quoting Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) 39 The Supreme Court has described the right to marry as "of fundamental importance for all individuals" and as "part of the fundamental 'right of privacy' implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause." Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, context, the Supreme Court has held that the rights of the alien spouse, not the rights of the U.S. citizen, are at issue. Furthermore, the citizen-spouse does not have a fundamental right to have his or her alien spouse remain in the United States. 40 Federal courts have held that even marriages valid under state law can be disregarded for immigration purposes if the congressional intent of the immigration law demonstrates that the marriage was not meant to be included. 41 The analysis for determining the validity of a marriage for immigration purposes is two-fold: The court must determine, first, whether the marriage is valid under state law and, second, whether the state-approved marriage qualifies under the INA. 42 Essentially, this analysis is checking whether the marriage conforms to public policy considerations on both state and federal levels.
Congress has written some limits into the INA as to what will be an acceptable marriage for immigration purposes. 44 represents Congress's intent to deny recognition of a marriage for immigration purposes, even if it was valid under state law. 45 However, sometimes a marriage may offend federal immigration policy based upon considerations outside those expressly written in the INA. Adams, a case in which the petitioner was trying to have his same-sex partnership recognized for immigration purposes, affirmed that INS has the power to exclude that type of marriage. The Adams court highlighted that marriages recognized under state law can be invalid for immigration purposes if the purported spouses do not plan to live together as husband and wife. 46 Additionally, marriages recognized by state or foreign law have 384 (1978) . The court has also stated " [m] arriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). 40 Anetekhai, 876 F.2d at 1222 (holding a two-year nonresidency requirement for aliens who marry U.S. citizens while subject to deportation proceedings to be constitutional 
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[Vol. 9:209 been considered invalid for immigration purposes if they are polygamous-thus offending federal and state public policy 47 -or incestuous, violating state public policy. 48 Although marriage has traditionally been considered the exclusive jurisdiction of state law, it must clear another hurdle to be recognized by federal law for immigration purposes.
B. The Defense of Marriage Act
One of the clearest indicia of federal public policy as it relates to the recognition of marriages for federal purposes is DOMA, 49 enacted in response to the possibility of homosexual marriage in the State of Hawaii.
50 Through DOMA, Congress sought to control the federal courts' application of the U.S. Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause, 51 anticipating a lawsuit where one state permitted same-sex marriage and other states had to determine if they would honor that marriage. 49 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. The legislative history reveals two purposes for the passage of the legislation: first was to "defend the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage;" second was to "protect the right of the States to formulate their own public policy regarding the legal recognition of same-sex unions, free from any federal constitutional implications that might attend the recognition by one State of the right for homosexual couples to acquire marriage licenses." H. plain that they consider Hawaii to be only the first step in a national effort to win by judicial fiat the right to same-sex 'marriage.' And the primary mechanism for nationalizing their break-through in Hawaii will be the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution." Id. Quoting the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund memorandum, the report states, "[m]any same-sex couples in and out of Hawaii are likely to take advantage of what would be a landmark victory. The great majority of those who travel to Hawaii to marry will return to their homes in the rest of the country expecting full legal recognition of their unions." Id. at 6-7. The report goes on to add that "[r]ecognition of same-sex 'marriages' in Hawaii could also have profound implications for federal law as well. The word 'marriage' appears in more than 800 sections of federal statutes and regulations, and the word 'spouse' appears more than 3,100 times. With very limited exceptions, these terms are not defined in federal law." Id. at 10. 55 See id. at 7 n.21. First, the State law regarding marriage would be thrown into disarray, thereby frustrating the legislative choices made by that State that support limiting the institution of marriage to male-female unions. Upholding traditional morality, encouraging procreation in the context of families, encouraging hetero-sexuality-these and other important legitimate governmental purposes would be undermined by forcing another State to recognize same-sex unions. Second, in a more pragmatic sense, homosexual couples would presumably become eligible to receive a range of government marital benefits. Id. 56 Id. at 8. 57 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) . 58 This question is answered in part by looking at the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law, which states that a marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy of another state having the most significant relationship to the spouse and the marriage at the time of the marriage. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF In these transsexual marriage cases, the issue is often framed as whether a post-operative transsexual can marry someone with the same birth-sex as the transsexual. 73 The majority of jurisdictions has answered that question by reading statutory silence as requiring the conclusion that sex is fixed at birth, which has resulted in a denial of marriages involving transsexuals as same-sex marriages. 74 One court held that sex can be surgically altered, and a person can be recognized as the new sex. 75 Other courts have essentially held that transsexuals are neither male nor female. 76 No judicial opinions appear to have considered the issue of whether a transsexual born the opposite sex of his or her partner, who then transitions anatomically to the same-sex as his or her partner, can marry under state law.
Although transsexual cases have taken place over thirty-eight years and emerge out of myriad factual scenarios in various jurisdictions, courts have been consistent in the structure of their analyses as well as the factors or considerations at play in deciding whether a transsexual marriage will be valid. 82 testimony on whether the non-transsexual spouse knew of the other spouse's transsexuality; 83 and the functionality of the new genitals or ability to consummate the marriage. 84 The courts' opinions also contain analyses of the statutory text from both the document-issuing state and the forum state regarding marriages, name changes, and ability to amend birth certificates. 85 All the courts also go through the history of transsexual cases, one by one, chronologically. 86 Despite how intimately transsexuality is tied to a medical diagnosis, as well as hormonal and surgical procedures, medical evidence is often given little weight in courts' decision-making processes when they defer to public policy. Of greater importance is deference to the legislature and statutory interpretation, especially for the more recent cases after the passage of DOMA, 87 although legislative deference predates DOMA in at least one case. 88 The courts focus on the statute governing birth certificate amendments from both the forum and document-issuing state: Specifically, whether the statute is corrective-fixing errors made at the time of birth-and whether it addresses post-sexual-reassignmentsurgery amendments of sex and name on the birth certificate. 89 If the forum state only has a corrective birth certificate statute, the court will determine, on state public policy grounds, that sex is fixed at birth and sexual reassignment cannot be legally recognized for marital purposes. 90 Courts that find sex can be reassigned treat the transsexual's
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[Vol. 9:209 gender as a matter of fact, 91 whereas courts that fix sex forever at birth treat gender as a matter of law. 92 Courts that treat sex determination as a matter of law, therefore, give little weight to documentary evidence and testimony from the transsexual and medical experts. 93 Because such cases are often of first impression, courts avoid granting homosexual marriage by allowing the legislature to resolve statutory silence. 94 III. CURRENT CIS POLICIES ON SAME-SEX AND TRANSGENDER MARRIAGE Transsexuals exist in both a legal and metaphysical netherspace: They have been constructed as neither heterosexual nor homosexual. 95 In their transitions from one sex to another, transsexuals are often caught between sexes.
96 Legally, they have been granted some rights to reflect their transition, but other rights and benefits have been withheld unfairly, furthering their disenfranchisement. 97 The newly-articulated federal immigration policy yet again places transsexuals in this legal limbo. 99 It expresses two mutually exclusive treatments; which treatment applies depends on whether or not the immigration benefit sought is marriage-related. 100 The memo explains that [i] n the context of adjudicating spousal and fiancé petitions, 91 M.T., 335 A.2d at 209. 92 In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 133-34. 93 Id. at 137. 94 Id. at 136; Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230; In re Nash, 2003 WL 23097095 at *6-7; Kantaras, 884 So. 2d at 155. 95 Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 226 (" 'Although transgenderism is often conflated with homosexuality, the characteristic, which defines transgenderism, is not sexual orientation, but sexual identity.' " (quoting Mary Coombs, Sexual Dis-Orientation: Transgendered People and Same-Sex Marriage, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 219, 237 (1998))). 96 See In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 135. 97 See, e.g., id. (recognizing that identity documentation had been legally changed but denying recognition of sex change, as a matter of law, for the purpose of marriage). 98 Yates, supra note 7. 99 Id. 100 Id. at 1.
CIS personnel shall not recognize the marriage, or intended marriage, between two individuals where one or both of the parties claims to be a transsexual, regardless of whether either individual has undergone sex reassignment surgery, or is in the process of doing so.
101
However, if the immigration benefit is not tied to marriage, the transsexual's sex will be his or her claimed sex-the one that is outwardly reflected, documented, and medically-fashioned-as it exists at the time of petition or application.
102
The CIS policy states that if a transsexual seeks marriage-based immigration benefits, as a matter of federal law, he or she will be considered forever locked in his or her birth-sex. 103 The transsexual and his or her partner will be denied federal marriage-based immigration benefits-even if the transsexual's birth-sex is opposite from the birth-sex of his or her partner-because "one or both of the parties claims to be a transsexual."
The policy revisions in this memo reflect two different, diametrically opposed motivations. First, the marriage policy revision is an attempt to honor DOMA, which bans any federal recognition of same-sex marriages for immigration purposes and defines marriage as an institution involving a "man" and a "woman. The CIS memo begins by highlighting the lack of federal statutes or regulations specifically addressing the question of whether 101 Id. 102 Id. 103 The policy statement that sex is determined "regardless of whether . . . [the] individual has undergone sex reassignment surgery" is analogous to birth-sex. Id. This is supported by the procedure outlined in the memo for when an adjudicating CIS officer detects from "objective evidence" that a name change or birth certificate change has occurred: All issued birth certificates should be requested, presumedly so that the "original" birth-sex can be determined. Without any specific citations to memos or cases, the memo further explains that INS "generally took the position that absent specific statutory authority recognizing sex changes for purposes of Federal immigration law; it could not recognize that a person could change his or her sex." 109 Despite identifying a transsexual only two sentences before as a person with a dissonant anatomical sex who seeks hormonal and surgical remedies, the memo cites Adams v. Howerton 110 and DOMA-both of which define marriage as between a "man and a woman" for immigration purposes-as primary reasons for this policy.
111
In addition to exposing DHS's fear of granting homosexual marriage, the memo highlights legislative silence, even in DOMA, on the issue of whether "a marriage between (for example) a man and a person born a man who has undergone surgery to become a woman should be recognized for immigration purposes or considered invalid as a same-sex marriage." 112 The memo restates the policies and gives specific examples to guide determinations on petitions. 113 For non-marital immigration benefits, immigration pro- 107 Id. at 2. 108 Id. ("Transsexualism is a condition in which a person feels persistently uncomfortable about his or her anatomical sex, and often seeks medical treatment, including hormonal therapy and 'sex reassignment surgery.' "). 109 Id. This statement is further cast into doubt by reference to another paragraph on the same page explaining that, in fact, the INS and CIS inconsistently granted immigration benefits to transsexuals. . 111 Yates, supra note 7, at 2 ("The legislative history of DOMA also clearly supports a traditional view of marriage, especially one that ties its basic character and importance to children, even though the marriage laws do not require that a couple be physically or mentally ready and able to procreate."). 112 Id. Again, in the face of statutory silence, DHS reads transsexuality as potentially homosexual and therefore against federal public policy. There is a great fear of the queer marriage. 113 Id. at 3.
[A] Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, or Form I-129F, Petition for Alien Fiancé(e), cannot be approved if one or both of the parties to the petition was born a sex other than what is claimed at the time of filing. This same policy applies to any immigration benefit that is granted based on a marital relationship. For example, an individual shall not be approved for H-4 status based on a marriage to a principal alien if either cedures have become less burdensome for transsexuals. 114 The new policy for non-marital immigration benefits will now allow for transsexuals to have federal identification and documentation that reflects the newly-transitioned sex. 115 This, too, is a policy departure from the previous CIS policy of issuing documents based on sex at birth, unless there was a typographical error or unless ordered by a federal judge. 116 It is unclear how CIS would handle a transsexual who first applies for replacement documentation that reflects the newly transitioned sex and subsequently applies for marriage-based immigration benefits.
117
The new policy seems designed for the ease of adjudicating officers, but it lacks rationality. In this blanket attempt to avoid granting a homosexual marriage, the resulting policy is overbroad and overinclusive in that it applies any time "one or both of the parties claims to be a transsexual, regardless of whether either individual has undergone sex reassignment surgery, or is in the process of doing so." 118 The mere act of claiming transsexuality has become a disqualifying factor, even if the relationship was heterosexual before one partner had sexual reassignment surgery or the marriage became heterosexual after transitioning sexes.
the principal alien or the potential H-4 beneficiary was born a sex other than what they claim to be at the time of filing." Id.
114 Id. at 3-4.
It is important to note that applicants are no longer required, as previously indicated in the I-90 Replacement National SOP at 6-22, to present a Federal court order directing the agency to change its records where such an alien [that has undergone sex reassignment surgery] indicates or claims a different gender than the one he or she was born with as reflected in his or her A-file. In instances where an individual is requesting a replacement document to acknowledge a name change resulting from sex reassignment surgery, the alien must submit the birth certificate issued at birth, the newly issued birth certificate reflecting the name and/or claimed sex reassignment, and the court order granting the legal name change . . . name changes arising in all other situation should be reviewed in accordance with established procedures. Id. 115 Id. 116 Id. at 2-3. 117 Presumably, although the documentation would reflect the new sex, an alien's A-file would reveal that the sex was transitioned and thus marriage benefits would be denied in light of the policy directives in this memo. 118 Yates, supra note 7, at 1. This policy affects not only a MTF transsexual who marries a male spouse or FTM transsexual who marries a female spouse (raising a possible implication of homosexuality), but also a MTF transsexual who marries a female spouse, a FTM transsexual who marries a male spouse, and two transsexuals both female or male at birth or oppositely sexed at birth who transition to opposite sexes.
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The new policy also represents a departure from the previous INS policy where birth-sex was fixed for immigration purposes.
119
This former policy was unfair in that it viewed sex as immutable; thus transsexual persons could not receive the recognition they sought so desperately. The former policy discriminated against only those couples with the same birth-sex where one partner had transitioned to the opposite sex. There was a possible problem for the INS under this policy, however: Fixing sex at birth meant the INS could recognize a marriage which appeas homosexual when a transsexual had sex reassignment. This may have brought about the new DHS policy that says, in effect, "I'm not going to figure out what sex you are or whether your marriage is valid under state law." This discriminatory effect on transsexuals stands in stark contrast to the policy that recognized transsexuals as their new sex when applying for immigration benefits that do not relate to marriage.
120
The full impact of these new policies has yet to be seen. Now that there is an official articulation of CIS's policy on transsexuals, it is likely that cases will emerge referencing and further documenting its interpretation. Although this memo was issued to clarify CIS's policy on transsexuals, anyone more familiar with the issues of transgender or transsexual people would realize that this policy is anything but clear.
Despite these new policy directives, the first two BIA cases on the subject of transsexual marriage for immigration purposes did not acknowledge them, and these cases have seriously undermined the anti-homosexual rationale as applied to transsexuals, 121 as described in the next section. It was not until the third case that the BIA acknowledged the new policy and found its pre-transsexual marriage ruling consistent with the terms of the policy directive. 122 119 Id. at 2. 120 Id. at 1.
In instances where an individual claims to be a transsexual, but the gender of the individual is not pertinent to the underlying application or petition, CIS personnel shall consider the merits of the application without regard to the applicant's transsexuality. issue was framed as two questions: First, whether the petitioner's marriage to the beneficiary was "a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife;" and second, whether the petitioner's spouse was "a person of the opposite sex who is a . . . wife" under § 7 of DOMA, where the beneficiary was born male but had undergone a legally recognized sex change.
159
The undisputed facts of the case were derived from several documentary sources, including an amended birth certificate, a marriage certificate, and a certified copy of the Manila Regional Trial Court's decision, which was based, in part, on testimony evidence provided by medical experts and the beneficiary. 160 Esperanza Martinez was born in the Phillipines as Barry Rommel De Sana Martinez in 1966.
161 Esperanza testified to having felt like a woman in a man's body since childhood and having sex-reassignment surgery, beginning with breast augmentation in 1988, removal of testicles in 1990, and sex reassignment in January 2000.
162
A plastic surgeon who examined Esperanza testified, as reported in the Manila decision, that she had the external genitalia of a female, including a vagina, clitoris, and labia majora and minora, but she lacked reproductive capacity. 163 In May 2001, based on the findings as described above in the Manila case, the Filipino court officially recognized Esperanza's change of sex from male to female. 164 The beneficiary's birth certificate was amended to reflect, pursuant to that court order, the name at birth as Esperanza de Sena Martinez. 165 Additionally, the couple submitted a certificate of marriage indicating that they were legally married in the Philippines on July 7, 2001 . 166 The certificate of marriage recorded the petitioner's sex as male and the ben- 159 Id. at *3. 160 Id. at *1-2. 161 Id. at *1. 162 Id. at *2. 163 Id. 164 The Manila judge, after considering the evidence, wrote:
'This court believes that the granting of the petition, more than its denial, would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With the sexual reassignment, the petitioner does not only think, feel, and act like a woman, but now looks like a woman. That she has no ovary and cannot conceive does not make her less of a woman, in the same manner that a woman who cannot bear a child ceases to be a woman.' Id. at *2 (quoting Certified Copy of Decision in Civil Case No. 00-99337, at 2). 165 Id. at *1. 166 Id. at *2.
eficiary's sex as female.
167
The reasoning of the Service Center focused on the definitions of "spouse" and "marriage" found in DOMA. 168 The Service Center concluded that, although some states and countries allowed transsexuals to legally change their sex, it had no legal basis to recognize Experanza's sex change because of legislative silence on whether two persons with the same birth-sex could be married for immigration purposes. 169 Therefore, it concluded that the marriage between Esperanza and her husband Jacob was invalid for immigration purposes and denied the petition. 170 The BIA found that the relevant immigration statute was INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), which allows spouses to be an "immediate relative" for an immigrant visa but does not define "spouse," "wife," or "husband" except for in the INA § 101(a)(35) provision. 171 The BIA also laid out the text of DOMA Section Seven, which defines "marriage" and "spouse" for federal purposes. 172 Yet, in its analysis section, the BIA made a sharp departure from other state transsexual marriage cases. 173 Employing basic principles of statutory construction to determine Congressional intent, the BIA found that neither the text of DOMA nor its legislative history provided guidance on how to determine whether a marriage involving a postoperative transsexual should be considered a same-sex or an opposite-sex marriage. 174 Ultimately, the BIA determined that the state of the law on transsexual marriages at the time of the passage of the DOMA, in addition to DOMA's explicit focus on preventing recognition of "homosexual" marriages, led to the conclusion that Esperanza and Jacob's marriage may be considered a marriage between persons of "opposite sex" under Section Seven of DOMA. 175 The BIA reasoned that, when DOMA was passed in 1996, the legal landscape included a number of state legislatures that had directly addressed the issue of legal recognition of sex changes after surgical procedures. 176 178 The legal landscape as constructed by the BIA also included the federal government's proposed Model State Vital Statistics Act, created a year after M.T. v. J.T., which included a section that specifically addressed legal recognition of sex changes by surgical procedure. 179 The BIA noted that many states then adopted legislation modeled after Model Act.
180
Most significant to the BIA was the fact that DOMA was created in response to Baehr v. Lewin. 181 The BIA, employing strict textualistism, noted that the Conference Report, cited as DOMA's legislative history, "repeatedly refers to the consequence of 'permitting homosexual couples to marry' . . . [while] [t]here is no mention of the treatment of transsexual marriages or of state laws recognizing sex changes by post-operative transsexuals." 182 In the House Report's section-by-section analysis, the BIA found the most convincing evidence that DOMA was not meant to include transsexuals: "Prior to the Hawaii lawsuit, no state has ever permitted to someone who had stayed. 246 The government argued that Congress chose to treat these two classes differently, however: Analogous discretionary relief is available to aliens under § 244(a)(2), but those who commit a deportable offense must stay in the country for ten years. 247 The court found that this argument overlooked the fact that deportable residents easily qualify for § 212(c) relief if they briefly leave the country. 248 The Second Circuit reviewed the INA provisions at issue, despite recognizing the virtually unrestricted authority of Congress and the executive branch to regulate the admission and retention of aliens. 249 The court noted, however, that the enforcement of these policies was subject to the procedural safeguards of due process, 250 and then it reviewed the provisions under a minimal scrutiny test, stating that " [d] istinctions between classes of persons must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."
251 Ultimately, the Second Circuit decided in the petitioner's favor:
Fundamental fairness dictates that permanent resident aliens who are in like circumstances, but for irrelevant and fortuitous factors, be treated in a like manner. We do not dispute the power of the Congress to create different standards of admission and deportation for different groups of aliens. However, once those choices are made, individuals within a particular group may not be subjected to disparate treatment on criteria wholly unrelated to any legitimate governmental interest.
252
The petitioner was allowed to seek discretionary relief from the Attorney General. Although the issues in Francis, a 1976 case, are not identical those at the heart of later trans-marriage cases, Francis still demonstrates the possibility of a successful equal protection challenging to INA provisions. Part the case's success, however, was that the two classes were narrowly drawn in comparison to each other. Francis, therefore, offers a potential strategy for overturning the new DHS policy on transsexuals, even if a federal appeals court eventually overturns In re Widener. The comparison groups in such a case would be transsexuals seeking immigration benefits related to marriage versus those seeking other immigration benefits. A perfect plaintiff would be a transsexual applying for marriage benefits who had originally sought and received new immigration documentation-such as work papers-which acknowledge the person with the new sex. In this way, DHS would be treating the same person as male in one instance and female in another. The comparison groups could also be two aliens with similar countries of origin and sexual-reassignment surgeries, but one applies for marriage-based benefits and the other for non-marriage-based benefits.
VII. CONCLUSION
The drafters of the INA most likely never imagined the statute's applicability to transsexual aliens. Consequently, it was not until 2004 that the Department of Homeland Security first articulated a policy interpreting the INA as applied to transsexual marriages. District directors now must determine if they can extend the meaning of the INA to new factual and unanticipated circumstances. With each such application, meaning is created and, in at least the three cases mentioned above, contested. In general, understanding transsexualism is a new task for most decision-makers, who justify their apprehension to decide these cases by referring to them as ones of "first impression" or going through all previously decided transsexual marriage cases.
Currently, INA's applicability to transsexual marriages is actively contested; which interpretation will ultimately prevail remains to be seen. Since immigration cases rarely reach the Supreme Court (and infrequently go to federal circuit courts), statutory interpretation takes place in lower courts.
In addition, the complicated analysis required to adjudicate transsexual marriages for immigration purposes begs the question: Why are so many rights in the United States inextricably linked with the institution of marriage? Transsexual marriage immigration cases demonstrate that petitioners succeed only by distinguishing their marriages from homosexual marriages-the scourge of modern America. These cases do nothing to defeat the anti-homosexual mentality in the United States.
There are other limitations to the authority of these cases. First, they depend heavily on the ability to show-via documentary, medical, and legal evidence-that a person has surgically altered his or her genitals. Second, they reinforce and reify medical authority over queer bodies. Third, they do nothing to expand people's views of gender and sex beyond the binaries of male and female. Fourth, the holdings of these cases are regrettably limited to transsexuals fortunate enough to live in states where sex changes are legally recognized.
Ultimately, In re Ady Oren, In re Esperanza Martinez Widener, and In re Jose Mauricio Lovo-Lara are a part of the body of cases dealing with transsexual marriage. The BIA interprets DOMA to exclude transsexuals under federal law and should continue to be cited for such a proposition. However, the federal appeals courts have not ruled on this specific issue, meaning that there is still a chance these cases may be overturned.
In the spirit of hope, these cases potentially mark an interpretative swing of the pendulum back toward M.T. v. J.T., restoring of dignity and humanity of transsexuals. Ultimately, such a policy is more enlightened and in keeping with the overall goal of immigration law to reunite families. However, we must be mindful that M.T. implemented a strict genital-surgery requirement, which, while acknowledging the person's gender identity, was incredibly burdensome and-for many people-impossible. Although it bestowed certain rights, it did not offer the model policy that transgender activists would like to see enacted.
